The Königswinter Conference was established in 1950 with the aim of improving the troubled relationship between Germany and Great Britain. It takes its name from the Rhineside spa opposite Bonn where the Conference took place initially. Since then the Conference has convened once a year bringing together around 80 German and British politicians, diplomats, business managers, academics and journalists for a profound exchange of ideas. Königswinter has created bonds and friendships helping to improve the understanding of policy differences on topical issues and challenges and to work towards common approaches. The issues discussed over the years have ranked from security policy, the Atlantic alliance, European integration, the future of the welfare state, education policy and the integration of ethnic minorities to international economic policy. The Königswinter Conference is organised jointly by the Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft and its British counterpart, UK Koenigswinter.

Location, Date and Programme

The Königswinter Conference takes place alternately in Germany or Britain, normally in spring or early summer of each year. The overall theme of the Conference is always a broad one in order to allow for exchange between participants of different backgrounds.

The conference lasts for two days, beginning with a plenary discussion. Afterwards, participants break up into working groups devoted to in depth discussion of a specific topic, such as security issues or economic questions. The conference usually begins with a plenary discussion. Results of these working group meetings are presented in the closing session.

Participants of Königswinter

The Joint British-German Steering Committee decides on the topics of the following year’s conference several months in advance, taking into account current political and social trends. This also ensures that there is enough time to select and invite suitable participants.

Participants are selected by the Königswinter Steering Committee, and invited by Königswinter UK, respectively by the Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft, the organising bodies of the Conference. Moreover, the organisers gladly accept nominations of suitable candidates by former attendees, our partners and other stakeholders in public life. We will consider these recommendations depending on the candidates’ professional profiles and the conference themes.

Over the past decades, it has proven useful to maintain a mix of “newcomers” and experienced participants with the aim of maintaining the spirit of Königswinter as well as promoting novel connections.
If you would like to submit a nominee, please contact Mari Mittelhaus, Conference Manager: headoffice(at)debrige(dot)de

Themes of Königswinter

The agenda covers topical issues, for example European integration, the future of the welfare state, the international economy, joint European defence policy or growing ethnic diversity and its implications for our societies. Working groups discuss allocated topics and report their results at the closing session.

Please click here for past years‘ themes.

Reports

For conference reports please visit the publications section.

The 21st Economic Königswinter Conference took place in London at the end of October 2023.

Nicolai von Ondarza, Die verlorene Wette. Entstehung und Verlauf des britischen EU-Referendums Der Brexit wird das Vereinigte Königreich und Europa über Jahre prägen. Doch wie konnte es überhaupt zur Ansetzung der Volksabstimmung kommen? Wie sind die Kampagnen verlaufen und was hat zum Sieg der EU-Gegner beigetragen? Hier lesen/herunterladen.

Julie Smith, Europa und das Vereinigte Königreich. Kleine Geschichte der Beziehungen seit 1945 Im Beitrag werden die schwierigen Beziehungen zwischen dem Vereinigten Königreich und der EU beleuchtet: von seiner anfänglichen Ablehnung sich zu engagieren über die verspätete Mitgliedschaft bis hin zur Entscheidung 2016, die Union zu verlassen. Hier lesen/herunterladen.

Roland Sturm, Uneiniges Königreich? Großbritannien nach dem Brexit-Votum Die britische Entscheidung, die EU zu verlassen, hat das Vereinigte Königreich territorial, politisch und gesellschaftlich gespalten. Diese Brüche zu überwinden, ist eine bisher ungelöste Aufgabe für die neue konservative Premierministerin. Hierlesen/herunterladen.

Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Am Rande der Verfassungskrise? Die rechtliche Grundlage des Brexit Was ist erforderlich, um das Ergebnis des Brexit-Referendums umzusetzen und was muss rechtlich gesehen auf eine Abstimmung für den EU-Austritt folgen? Weder die europäische Gesetzgebung noch die Abstimmung selbst fungieren in irgendeiner Weise als Leitlinie. Hier lesen/herunterladen.

Annegret Eppler, Doch nicht wie ein Fahrrad. Desintegrative Momente der europäischen Einigung Integration und Desintegration sind gleichzeitig ablaufende Prozesse, deren Ergebnisse mit denselben Indikatoren messbar sind. Nicht erst seit dem Brexit-Referendum stehen der europäischen Integration Stagnation und Rückschläge gegenüber. Hier lesen/herunterladen.

Wolfgang Franzen, Europäische Union in der Krise. Sichtweisen und Bewertungen in acht Mitgliedstaaten Die Sicht der Europäer auf die EU unterscheidet sich von Land zu Land. Der europäische Vergleich verdeutlicht die britische Sonderrolle und ein Nord-Süd-Gefälle, das geprägt ist von den unterschiedlichen Auswirkungen der Finanz- und Eurokrise. Hier lesen/herunterladen.
Das komplette Heft können Sie hier bestellen und als PDF oder EPUB für E-Reader herunterladen.

The lack of legitimacy of the European institutions endangers the European project. While many may demand more power for the European Parliament (the only European institution directly elected by the people), Prof Grimm made very clear that he feels this would not help decrease the legitimacy deficit of the European Union (EU).

Internal and external legitimacy

Prof Grimm pointed out that there are two kinds of legitimacy for the EU. Initially, legitimacy was established through the sovereignty of the member states (“external legitimation”) working together in the European Council while the parliament had an advisory function. When in 1979 the EP was for the first time elected directly, this was the start of the “dual legitimacy”; the EP creating “internal legitimacy” for the EU.
Photo: Prof. Anheier, Prof. Grimm, Dr. Graf Strachwitz
© Dahrendorf Forum/Oliver Hein

This internal legitimacy is in crisis, but not because the European Parliament (EP) does not have sufficient power. In fact, statistically voter turnouts declined whenever the EP’s powers were extended. According to Grimm, the central problem is that the elections for the EP are national, not European elections. National candidates of national parties campaign with national topics and agendas according to national election laws. Currently, around 200 different national parties have seats in the EP. Only after the elections, they form factions/parliamentary groups which then set a European political agenda. This missing link in campaigning and agenda setting causes problems of accountability and legitimacy.

A less noted development occurred through two judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the early 1960s: The court decided that EU law would be directly applicable in member states and that it would take precedence over national law in cases of collision – the question of compatibility being subject to ECJ jurisdiction. As a consequence, the European treaties were “constitutionalised”, i.e. they were de facto upgraded to a constitutional level by the ECJ. The problem Prof Grimm pointed out is that the treaties were never meant to have this status and therefore are not designed accordingly. Instead, they are a lot more extensive than a constitution should be.

“The more ordinary law in a constitution, the less democracy.”

This caused problems for the legitimacy of the EU. While political integration stagnated, legal integration was pushed forward through ECJ jurisdiction. As the common market was the centrepiece of the treaties, the four freedoms attached to it became “super fundamental rights”, protected by the ECJ. What lies at the heart of Prof Grimm’s thesis is this: The upgrade of the European treaties to constitutional level have overburdened the process of European integration unintendedly and unnecessarily.

Strengthening the powers of the EP means the EU would have to rely even more on its internal legitimacy – which is not a very promising approach given its constant crisis and the above stated reasons for it.

What can be done?

Prof Grimm drafted three major recommendations to improve the legitimacy problems of the EU and its institutions:

1. Grimm suggested the EP needs to be “Europeanised” and thereby brought closer to the public. Grimm argued for a Europeanisation of the party and election system of the EP. This way, interests could be expressed and balanced before the elections. According to Grimm, the EP needs to engage in European society – which needs a European substructure: European trade unions, parties, media etc.
2. There should be clearer limits of communitarisation. Not everything that touches the single market can be dealt with exclusively by the EU. This second suggestion strongly interrelates with the following.
3. Prof Grimm suggested a repolitisation of European politics. We should reduce the European treaties to only those laws that are indispensable for a constitution (e.g. aims, institutions, etc.), but downgrade all other provisions to secondary law. The constitutionalisation of the treaties is a fact and cannot be reversed. Political interference with the jurisdiction of the ECJ is not an option because of the separation of powers. But as the treaties’ de facto effect is that of a constitution, they should be designed like one. By downgrading all provisions to ordinary law which are not constitutional in nature, the right hierarchy of norms could be restored. At the same time, not a single provision would be lost. Legally speaking, this would be a very easy act. Politically, we would need the consent of all 27 member states.